This paper investigates the economic growth experiences of middle-income economies. Middle-income economies are classified into two groups, "convergence success" and "nonsuccess," based on their speed of transition to a high-income status over the period 1960-2014. "Convergence success" includes middle-income economies which graduated to a highincome status or have achieved rapid convergence progress. When an economy in the "nonsuccess" experienced growth deceleration and failed to advance to a high-income status, we defined such episodes as the "middle-income trap." We observe no clear pattern that the relative frequency of growth deceleration was higher when an economy transitioned from an upper middle-income status to a high-income status, thereby refuting the "middle-income trap hypothesis". The probit regressions show that in comparison to "non-successes," "convergence successes" tend to maintain strong human capital, large working-age population ratio, effective rule-of-law, low price of investment goods, and high levels of high-technology exports and patents. Adding to unfavorable demographic, trade and technological factors, rapid investment expansion and hasty deregulation could cause the "non-successes" to fall into the "middle-income trap."
Introduction
There is no question that the economic influence of emerging economies in the global economy is stronger than ever. The share of the "emerging market and developing economies" (emerging economies, hereafter) in the global gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) increased steadily from 36% in 1980 to 58% in 2016, as reported in the International Monetary Fund (2017) . During the global financial crisis of 2008, emerging economies were relatively resilient and maintained strong growth. A significant number of economies have shown strong long-term growth, catching up with the advanced economies in terms of their per capita income.
While there is a general optimism toward the prospects of emerging economies, the outlook remains uncertain. It is doubtful whether they can revert to long-term growth potentials amid weak global economic recovery and low productivity growth. In addition, given a sustained income gap between emerging and advanced economies, there is a growing concern that many emerging economies will never match the advanced economies, in terms of their per capita income, and would be rather trapped in a middle-income status. Thus, the approach to sustaining economic growth is an important policy challenge confronting emerging economies.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the sources of sustained long-term growth, with particular reference to experiences of middle-income emerging economies, over the past half-century. In particular, the investigation focuses on episodes of rapid transition from middle-to high-income status, and the significant growth slowdown that the middle-income economies went through. In order to elaborate, this paper will assess the factors that enable certain middle-income economies to transition to a high-income status, and those causing other middle-income economies to suffer from growth deceleration, thereby being trapped in the middle-income status.
There exists a considerable body of empirical literature studying the characteristics and sources of economic growth. Empirical literature adopts regression analysis using countrylevel data to identify the sources of long-term economic growth. Previous studies pioneered by Barro (1991) use cross-section data, where each country has only one observation. More recent studies use panel data involving a large number of countries over a long-term period, with years dating back to the 1960s and earlier (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Barro 2015) .
(2017), and Han and Wei (2017) do not strongly support that a transition from a middleincome status to a high-income status is more likely to lead to a low-growth trap. This paper is built on the above lines of literature. The focus is on exploring the sources of long-term growth performance of middle-income economies by distinguishing the income convergence process and the growth deceleration episode. We first classify middle-income economies into two groups, "convergence success" and "non-success," based on their speed of transition to a high-income status (i.e., regardless of their actual graduation to the highincome status in 2014). As evidenced that many middle-income economies achieved rapid convergence, graduating to a high-income status in a relatively short period, the convergencesuccess group includes all the episodes of middle-income economies in 1960 completing a transition to a high-income status over the period 1960-2014. This group also includes economies which showed outstanding growth performance (as defined by the growing average annual per-capita GDP growth rate of 3.0% or greater) over the period, even though they have not yet completed the transition to the high-income status. China and Romania are fine examples of the latter.
Further, we also note an episode of growth deceleration, in which a rapidly growing economy had a significant growth slowdown over a sustained period (as defined by a decrease of average annual per-capita GDP growth rate of at least 2 percentage points over at least 7 years). We then define the "middle-income trap" by the incident of growth deceleration that occurred in convergence non-success economies that failed to escape from the middle-income status.. Note that many convergence success economies also experienced growth deceleration, but managed to escape from the middle-income status, graduating to a highincome status during the period of 1960-2014. This paper analyzes the convergence process of middle-income economies based on the economic growth theory and discusses the key stylized facts between convergence successes and convergence non-successes. It also identifies the episodes of growth deceleration and assesses whether the relative frequency of growth deceleration was higher when an economy transitioned from an upper middle-income status to a high-income status, as implied by the middle-income trap hypothesis. We then examine the determinants of convergence successes and middle-income traps, using probit regressions. This paper contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it clearly distinguishes the convergence process from growth deceleration or middle-income trap episodes. In order to elaborate, an economy in the convergence non-success follows a low-growth convergence path leading toward a low level of a steady-state per capita income. In contrast, growth deceleration can occur when an economy shifts from one convergence path to a lower one through shifts in the rate of technological progress or the steady-state per capita output that the economy converges to. Hence, convergence non-successes do not necessarily undergo the middle-income trap, although their per capita income dynamics appear similar. Other studies, such as Aiyer et al. (2013) , Ito (2017) , and Felipe et al. (2017) , also note this distinction. We analyze this issue more clearly both in concepts and empirics. Second, based on new definitions, we assess the determinants of convergence success and the middle-income trap in a more cohesive manner. Using the probit regressions, we explain the critical factors for growth performance and convergence of the middle-income economies that have successfully advanced to the high-income status, in comparison to those observed in other economies that are trapped in middle-incomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the concepts of income convergence, growth deceleration, and middle-income trap in the framework of a neoclassical growth model and conditional convergence theory. Section 3 defines middle-income economies among a sample of 110 economies for which the GDP data are available for the 1960-2014 period, and identifies convergence successes and nonsuccesses. The paper also notes episodes of growth deceleration and middle-income-trap. In Section 4, the determinants of a convergence success and middle-income-trap are examined using statistical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Income Convergence, Growth Deceleration, and Middle-income Trap: Concepts
Over the past half century, middle-income economies have shown diverse growth performances. Figure 1 shows the annual per capita GDP from 1960 to 2014 for selected economies. Several successful East Asian economies, such as Singapore and South Korea have rapidly caught up to the United States of America (the U.S.) in per capita income, and have reached an income level of high-income economies owing to their strong and persistent growth. China's economy has also shown remarkable growth since 1980 by adopting a market-oriented reform and opening up to international trade. However, due to its relatively late start, it continues to be on the path of advancing from a middle-income status to a highincome status. In contrast to the rapid income convergence of these East Asian economies, the other middle-income economies have stagnated. Certain Latin American economies, including Brazil and Mexico, could not achieve a high-income status and even the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R. Congo) fell behind, with negative per capita income growth over the period. Malaysia; Taiwan, China; Singapore; Sri Lanka; and Thailand); also included are three Middle Eastern/North African economies (Cyprus; Egypt; and Malta); and Botswana, Panama, and Romania. In contrast, the 15 slowest-growing economies over the same period include 11 African and three Latin American economies. 3 These slowest-growing economies have not been able to escape the "poverty trap."
The evolution of the per capita income level and growth rates over time can be explained by the "conditional convergence" theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Acemoglu, 2009) , where a country with a low level of initial per capita output (income) relative to its own steady-state (long-run) potential has a higher growth rate than a country with a higher level of per capita output. The basic concept is that farther a country is located from its steady-state output or income level, larger is the gap of reproducible physical and human capital stock, and technology (total factor productivity) from its long-run levels. This gap offers a chance for a rapid leveling through high rates of physical and human capital accumulation, which are encouraged by higher rates of return on investment. Additionally, a country with such technology gaps can enjoy benefits of adopting and imitating technology from advanced economies to expedite improvements in productivity.
The typical conditional convergence equation can be written as follows: 4
where y(t) is an economy's per capita (or per-worker) output in period t, * is its steadystate level of per capita output, and x is the rate of technological progress, which is assumed to be exogenously given. In this equation, the per capita output growth rate (g) declines as the gap between the current level and steady-state level of per capita output narrows. Once the per capita income reaches a steady-state, the second term becomes zero and the per capita income increases at a constant rate of x. During transition to the steady-state, the growth rate is determined by the technological progress, which is the first term, and the convergence factor, which is the second term in equation (1).
In equation (1), denotes the speed of convergence. Around the steady-state, the speed of convergence is as follows:
where is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, and in a competitive economy, this equals the capital share of output, is the rate of population growth, and is the capital depreciation rate.
Assume that the U.S. per capita income reached a steady-state and grows at a constant rate of technological progress. The conditional convergence equation can be rewritten in terms of it being relative to the U.S. as follows: to all economies and the technological progress rate is determined exogenously to individual economies. However, it can be determined endogenously and can differ across economies for a certain period. According to the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990) , the development of new technologies depends on the innovative capacity of the economy.
For low-and middle-income economies, technology adaptation and imitation are also considered to be important for its convergence. An economy's speed of catch-up to the global technology frontier is inversely related to the gap between the domestic and global levels of technological sophistication (Gerschenkron, 1962) . This implies that as the technological gap narrows, it becomes more challenging for emerging economies to catch up with the more advanced technologies. Hence, technological progress, or broadly productivity improvement of an economy hinges on policies that stimulate technological innovation and adaptation, and on removal of structural bottlenecks that impede productivity growth. Figure 3 illustrates the convergence path of a hypothetical benchmark economy in which the per capita output was 10% of that of the U.S. in 1960, and converges to the steady-state per capita income, which is assumed to be 60% of the U.S. level. The exogenous technological progress rate is given by 1.9%, which is equal to the average U.S. annual per capita GDP growth rate over the 1960-2014 period. The convergence speed is assumed to be 0.02 per year (Barro, 2015) . The convergence to the steady-state takes a long period of time with this assumed speed. Figure Figure 3 , Panel B shows that the per capita GDP growth rates along the growth path in Scenario B are much lower than those in Scenario A, and thereby its path reaches a lower level of steady-state per capita GDP than that of Scenario A.
[ Figure 4 here] An economy can change its convergence path either upward or downward. If an economy shifts to a higher convergence path during the transition, it would show a much faster leveling with the U.S. income level. In contrast, an economy can shift to the lower path when its technological progress or steady-state per capita income level to which the economy converges is worsened. In literature, the idea of a middle-income trap is often associated with this pattern of economic growth, generally characterized by a sharp deceleration in growth over a sustained period, which consequently leads to the failure of a middle-income economy to advance toward a high-income status (Eichengreen et al., 2012; Aiyar et al., 2013; Ito, 2017) . In this framework, the middle-income trap, which is defined by the growth deceleration, is distinguished from slow convergence along a given convergence path. Figure 4 illustrates the case of middle-income trap in which a middleincome economy is trapped in a middle-income status when it shifts downward from a convergence path (the benchmark case in Figure 3 ) to a low-growth convergence path (Scenario B in Figure 3 ). The hypothetical middle-income economy is assumed to experience a significant growth slowdown over 10 years in the 1980s and then either return to a convergence path (non-trapped) or remain in a low-growth path (trapped). 6
Identification of Convergence Success, Growth Deceleration, and Middle-Income

Trap
In this section, we analyze income convergence and growth performance of middle-income economies, focusing on episodes of convergence success, growth deceleration, and middleincome trap. Both absolute and relative income-based approaches are subject to limitations as they both rely on arbitrary thresholds to set the middle-income economy. Moreover, as the existing studies use different data sources and time periods, the classifications do not always generate the same identification for middle-income countries.
This study adopts a relative income-based approach for both theoretical and practical reasons. Convergence applies to the growth path, along which an economy reduces its per capita income gap relative to advanced economies over time, given that the other factors remain unchanged. If all economies approach the same steady-state per capita GDP, convergence tends to reduce cross-sectional dispersion of per capita income. In addition, the idea of the middle-income trap is also originally associated with how an economy can achieve a smooth transition to a high-income status by shifting its low-wage growth strategy to a new one relying more on productivity and technology (Gill and Kharas, 2007) ;
the relative wage and productivity is significant in competitiveness in the international markets.
economy to reach a high income status eventually, although its income gap with advanced economies widens over time. In addition, it is challenging to update the absolute income thresholds regularly so as to reflect the evolution of incomes in other economies.
We divide countries into three income groups-low, middle, and high-based on their GDP per capita relative to the U.S. The most updated version of the Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0) database is used (Feenstra et al., 2015) . Low-income economies are defined as those that have a PPP GDP per capita of less than 5%, middle-income economies as those between 5% and 40%, and high-income economies are those above 40% of the U.S. PPP [ Figure 5 here]
Existing studies often consider only these graduates as successful episodes in terms of judging economic growth performance of middle-income economies. However, as discussed in the previous section, despite an outstanding performance, there exist several economies that could not escape from the middle-income status due to their late start. For example, in Figure 2 , Romania nearly makes up to the "graduates" list (the top of the middle quadrant), but remains in the middle-income status in 2014. Its per capita GDP with 4% average per capita GDP growth rate over the 1960-2014 period increased from 8% of the U.S. in 1960 to 39.8% in 2014 (Table 1) . China is another example as its average per capita GDP growth rate was initially low but accelerated since the 1980s, when China embarked on an economic opening up and a series of reforms. China's strong economic growth over the past half-century contributed to the narrowing of the per capita income gap with advanced economies. Its per capita income relative to the U.S. increased from 6.7% of that of the U.S. in 1960 to 23.9% in 2014.
[ Table 1 here]
Thus, we classify middle-income economies into "convergence successes" and "nonsuccesses," based on their speed of transition to the high-income status. This classification is based on reasonable but somewhat arbitrary criteria. In order to be a convergence success, an economy must meet either of the two following conditions. First, if an economy has ever completed a transition from a middle-income to a high-income status over the period 1960-2014, it is identified as a convergence success. Economies in the convergence success group are presented in the upper panel of Table 1 . For example, Korea from 1960 to 1992
and Chile from 1960 to 2010 are included in this group. Once the economy graduated to a high-income, it is classified into the high-income category. Second, a convergence success also refers to a middle-income economy that grew at an average annual growth rate of over 3% during the period 1960-2014, even though it did not advance to the high-income status by 2014. According to the benchmark scenario in Figure   3 , a middle-income economy with 10% of the U. [ Table 2 here]
As discussed in Section 2, the concept of convergence non-success is not identical to that of the middle-income trap. Convergence non-successes are slow-growing economies that were not able to transit to the high-income category over the period 1960-2014, and would be unlikely to do so in the future if they continued their historical convergence path. In contrast, the middle-income trap is defined as the episode of growth deceleration of the convergence non-successes during the sample period. In addition to convergence nonsuccesses, success economies could also experience a significant decline in their per capita GDP growth rate as a consequence of the deterioration in growth factors that could shift the economy toward a low-growth convergence path.
More specifically, growth deceleration at time t is defined by an incident when an economy with an average per capita GDP growth rate of 3% or greater per annum over the 7 years prior to t undergoes a decrease in the average per capita GDP growth rate by 2 percentage points or more over at least 7 years after t. This criterion is symmetrically based on Hausmann et al. (2005) 's analysis of growth acceleration, which is defined by an increase in per capita GDP growth rate of at least two percentage points or more in an economy where the average growth rate is 3.5% or greater in the proceeding period. Eichengreen et al. (2012) define the middle-income trap as a growth slowdown of at least 2 percentage points from the 7-year average per capita GDP growth rate of 3.5% or greater in emerging market economies with per capita income greater than $10,000. We use 3% instead of 3.5% as a threshold for the average per capita GDP growth rate in the period prior to the growth deceleration, considering that the average growth rate in a normal convergence path can bes 3%. If in a number of consecutive years the criteria of a growth deceleration are met, we follow the methodology of Hausmann et al. (2005) and choose the timing of the initiation of the growth deceleration by the year, among all adjacent eligible dates, which maximizes the F-statistic of a spline regression with a break in the relevant year. We also define an independent episode of growth deceleration as long as its initiation date is more than 5 years apart from the proceeding episode. We also diagnose it as a growth deceleration when an economy experiences a decrease in the average per capita GDP growth rate by 2 percentage points or more over 6, 5, and 4 years after 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. 8 Based on our definitions, we found 152 growth decelerations over the 1960-2014 period, which corresponds to 14% of the total sample. 9 We identify 89 growth decelerations for middle-income economies, among which, 32 episodes were experienced by convergence successes and 57 by convergence non-successes. Growth deceleration in the non-successes corresponds to the middle-income trap.
[ Figure 6 here] 1960 , 1975 , 1980 slowdowns occurred only once in 1981.
[ Table 3 here] the hypothesis that middle-income economies are more likely to experience growth slowdowns than low-income economies, but the probability of experiencing growth deceleration is not particularly high in comparison to high-income economies. This finding contrasts to that of Aiyer et al. (2013) , which finds that the relative frequency of growth decelerations for middle-income economies is significantly higher than that for low-income as well as high-income economies. They use the absolute income thresholds for income classification and different definitions to identify growth slowdowns. As observed in Table   3 , the frequency of growth decelerations was higher for both middle-income and high- 
Determinants of Convergence Success and Middle-Income Trap
This section explores the major factors that can best explain convergence success and growth deceleration of the middle-income economies over the past half-century. The empirical strategy is to identify the factors that are statistically significantly associated with the probability of an economy being a convergence success or falling into the middle-income trap.
The regression applies to a panel set of cross-country data for 75 economies over 10 five-year periods from 1965 to 2014, corresponding to the 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2004-2009, and 2010-2014 In the empirical specification, we control an economy's per capita GDP relative to the U.S. at the beginning of the period t, following the specification of conditional convergence equation
(3), and then observe if there are other factors that determine the probability of an economy experiencing convergence success or middle-income trap. In addition, the regressions include period dummies to control for the common effects of global shocks in all economies.
As the incidence of convergence success or middle-income trap is a binary-choice variable, we use a probit regression model. 10 Any factor influencing an economy's convergence success probability positively can also affect its probability of escaping from the middle-income trap. In addition, middle-income economies could face particular challenges when they advance to the high-income status as their growth strategies that were successful until then may continue to work under new circumstances. Recent papers highlighted the critical factors that trigger or prevent the middle-income trap (Eichengreen et al., 2012; Aiyar et al., 2013; Agénor 2017; Bulman et al., 2017; World Bank, 2017) . They emphasize on resource reallocation across industries to facilitate continuous product diversification and sophistication, which are important to sustain productivity growth and export competitiveness. Some studies highlight the role of human capital and institutional capacity for enabling efficient resource allocation and industrial upgrading. Eichengreen et al. (2013) show that growth slowdowns occur less frequently in economies with a large share of the population with higher secondary and tertiary education, and a large share of high technology exports. Aiyar et al. (2013) show that variables related to institutions, demography, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and economic and trade structures are important determinants for growth slowdowns. Bulman et al. (2017) find that macroeconomic management, income equality, and export-orientation are positively associated with the probability of an economy escaping from the middle-income trap.
We categorize our explanatory variables into four broad categories-demographics and human capital, institutions, macroeconomic environment and policies, and economic and industry structure. We include the explanatory variables that are commonly found in the previous literature, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 11 Column (1) of Table 4 reports the results of the probit estimation for the probability of an economy becoming a convergence success. The specification includes only the level term as the difference term is always statistically insignificant in all the regressions, when it is considered together with the level term. Subsequent to controlling for per capita GDP relative to the U.S. and the period dummies, we find that the probability of convergence success is strongly associated with demographic and human capital variables, including average years of schooling, fertility, life expectancy, and dependency ratio. Convergence successes also tend to better maintain the rule-of-law, low inflation, free international trade, a high investment rate, low price of investment goods, and low public debt in comparison to nonsuccesses. In addition, higher levels of financial opening, foreign direct investment inflows, manufacturing exports, high-technological exports, and patents are also presented as important in being a convergence success.
[ Table 4 here]
Column (2) of Table 4 shows that the results in Column (1) change very little in IV estimation. Thus, the close bivariate relationship does not appear to come from reverse causality or omitted variables.
[ Table 5 here]
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of probit estimation for the probability of an economy falling into a middle-income trap. The specifications for the investment rate, regulation 12 and financial openness include the difference terms, in addition to the level, of the explanatory variables, as they are statistically significant. The results show that higher levels of fertility and dependency ratio tend to increase the probability of the economy being trapped in the middle-income status. Manufacturing export and high-technology exports are negatively associated with the probability of a middle-income trap. Thus, these demographics, human capital, and export variables are important factors for achieving convergence success and escaping from a middle-income trap.
In contrast to the regression for convergence success, the investment rate is identified to be statistically insignificant for the probability of the middle-income trap, while the price of investment goods appears significantly positive. Interestingly, the change of investment rate, with its level fixed, is positively associated with the probability of a middle-income trap.
Similarly, changes in the level of regulatory restraints and financial opening are also statistically significant and positive, while their levels have insignificant effects. Hence, rapid increases in the levels of investment, deregulation and financial opening can increase the probability of falling into a middle-income trap. This may reflect that middle-income countries have often suffered financial crises following investment boom, hasty deregulation, and rapid financial opening.
Column (2) of Table 5 presents the results of the IV estimation. 13 It shows that the binary relationship in column (1) remains unchanged after controlling for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. An exception is the terms-of-trade variable. The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant in column (1), but becomes negative and statistically significant with the IV estimation in column (2). It may indicate that when controlled for the endogeneity, the improvement in terms-of-trade is more likely to reduce the probability of falling into a middle-income trap.
The probit results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that some explanatory variables have statistically significant relationships with the probability of convergence success or middle-income trap, when we include only the initial relative income, period dummies, and one other explanatory variable at a time as regressors. We also examine whether the bivariate relationship holds when the explanatory variables are included jointly.
[ Table 6 here]
The results of the probit regressions for convergence success are presented in Table 6 .
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the probit regressions without IVs. The explanatory variables include the initial relative income, average years of schooling, rule-of-law, international trade openness, investment rate, price level of investment and patent. Unfortunately, the inclusion of several variables reduces the sample size significantly. Nonetheless, the major results hold robust in this specification. The result supports the positive effects of average years of schooling, better maintenance of rule-of-law, low price of investment goods, and higher levels of international trade openness and patent.
Column (2) of Table 6 shows the probit regression with IVs for the probability of convergence success. Note that the number of observations shrinks as lagged values are used as IVs. They show that the major results in column (1) are similar in the IV estimation that controls the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The Wald test statistic shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of the instrumented variables.
[ Table 7 here]
We also execute probit regressions for the probability of middle-income trap when the major explanatory variables are included jointly. Column (1) of Table 7 presents the probit results without IVs and column (2) presents the IV estimation results. The result in column
(1) shows that a high investment rate, high investment goods price, low trade openness, and a low level of high-technology exports are significantly and positively associated with the probability of an economy falling into a middle-income trap. In this specification, average years of schooling, dependency rate and rule-of-law are included, and these variables are statistically insignificant.
In column (2) of Table 7 , where the average years of schooling is excluded, the estimated coefficient on dependency ratio is positive and statistically significant, though marginally indicating that a relatively large working-age population tends to lower the probability of falling into a middle-income trap. We also find in column 2 that the changes in regulation and financial opening are statistically significant, indicating a reduction in regulatory restraints or increase in financial openness, given that their levels tend to increase the probability of the middle-income trap. Specification (3) includes high-technology exports, controlling other factors, and it is statistically significant and negatively associated with the probability of the middle-income trap. In addition, the price of investment goods appears significantly negative.
The results of the probit regression with IVs are presented in column (2) of Table 7 . Here, investment rate and investment goods price become statistically insignificant. But, the change in investment rate is also positively and statistically significant, indicating that a rapid expansion in investments can cause an economy to fall in the "middle-income trap."
Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated the economic growth experiences of middle-income economies over the past half-century, by focusing on episodes of convergence successes and middleincome trap. Among the sample of 110 economies for which GDP data are available for the 1960-2014 period, we identified 14 middle-income economies that graduated to the highincome status, 9 middle-income economies showed strong growth as convergence successes, and 52 middle-income economies were diagnosed as convergence non-successes.
Furthermore, a middle-income trap was defined as an episode of growth deceleration that occurred only to convergence non-successes over a certain period of time. This analysis found no clear pattern that the relative frequency of growth deceleration was higher when the relative income approached the upper middle-income range, thereby refuting the middle-income trap hypothesis.
Further, this paper explored the causes of differences in growth experiences among the middle-income economies. Convergence successes in comparison to non-successes, tend to maintain sound policy factors, including strong human capital, effective rule-of-law, a high investment rate, low investment good price, high trade openness, and also achieve industrial upgrading, as indicated by higher levels of high-technology manufacturing exports and patent. In contrast, non-successes in the middle-income trap tend to have weak demographic factors, high investment goods price, low trade openness, lower level of manufacturing exports and high-technology exports, rapid investment expansion, and hasty deregulation.
As observed from historical experiences, many middle-income economies underwent growth slowdowns following rapid economic growth. They grew fast at the early stage of economic development, but their further economic growth was increasingly hindered by slower pace of convergence, structural problems and stagnant productivity growth. Thus, a smooth transition to a high-income status of an economy hinges critically on whether it continues to maintain strong convergence by adopting sound policies and institutions, and Using that approximation and (A.1), we derive a convergence equation for y(t) as follows:
where ( * ) is the elasticity of output with respect to capital around the steady-state value * and β ≡ �1 − ( * )�( + + ) is the speed of convergence measuring how fast the economy reduces the gap in per worker output between the current and the steady-state levels.
We can rewrite the convergence equation in terms of it being relative to that of the U.S. as follows: 
Notes:
A convergence success refers to an economy that advanced from a middle-income status to a high-income status during the period 1960-2014, or an economy whose per capita GDP increased at an average annual growth rate over 3.0% over the period, even though it has not graduated to a highincome status. Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable for being a convergence success. The probit regression applies to an unbalanced panel data set of 5 economies over 10 five-year periods from 1965 to 2014. The speciation includes all the listed regressors and period dummies. The IV probit estimation technique uses lagged values of the explanatory variables as IVs. The variables, such as relative income and average years of schooling that are measured as values at the initial year of each period are used as own IVs. The speciation includes all the listed regressors and period dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10%, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable for falling into a middle-income trap. The probit regression applies to an unbalanced panel data set of 62 economies over 10 five-year periods from 1965 to 2014. The speciation includes all the listed regressors and period dummies. The IV probit estimation technique uses lagged values of the explanatory variables as IVs. Those variables measured as initial values at each five-year period or over the previous five-year period are used as own IVs. The speciation includes all the listed regressors and period dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10%, respectively.
Figure 1. Trends in Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in Selected Economies
Note: Data are per capita GDP in PPP international dollars (2011 constant prices) from the Penn World Table 9 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) .
Figure 2. Growth Rate versus Initial GDP, 1960-2014
Note: Author's calculations based on data on per capita GDP in PPP international dollars (2011 constant prices) from the Penn World Table 9 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) .
Figure 3. Convergence Paths of a Hypothetical Middle-Income Economy, 1960-2014
A. Relative Level of Per Capita GDP
B. Per Capita GDP Growth Rates
Notes: In the benchmark scenario, a hypothetical economy is assumed to have 10% of the U.S. per capita GDP in 1960, and converges to 60% of the U.S. per capita GDP in the steady-state. It has an exogenous technological progress rate of 1.9%, which equals the average U.S. annual per capita GDP growth rate over the 1960-2014 period. The convergence speed is assumed to be 0.02. Scenario A assumes that the economy converges to the same level as that of the U.S. per capita output in the steady-state and the technological progress rate is given by 3% annually. Scenario B assumes that the economy converges to only 30% of the U.S. per capita output in the steady-state and the technological progress rate is given by 0.5%.
. Note: A hypothetical middle-income economy following a benchmark convergence path as in Figure 3 is assumed to experience a significant growth slowdown over 10 years in the 1980s and then either return to the same convergence path (non-trapped) or stay in a low-growth path (trapped). Table 9 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) . 
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